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Abstract 
 
 
The threat of terrorism perceived by the American public has been shaped by a series of 
traumatic events over the past decade. In the years following the attacks of September 11, 2001, 
fear of terrorism has extended beyond the threat of terrorist groups. Much of the American public 
considers not only terrorist groups like al-Qaeda, but the entire religion of Islam to be a security 
threat. In much of this security discourse, ideas of hatred, violence, and terror have become 
associated with Islam. This study explores that association, and aims to identify what motivates 
existing stereotypes. Drawing on research from the Chapman University Survey of 
American Fears, we will analyze responses to suspicion and public approval of increased 
security, in order to evaluate the relationship that exists between fear and the religion of Islam. 
We will consider the perceived nature of Muslim people among the American public, and the 
stereotypes which have contributed to the construction of Islamophobia. Though Americans are 
divided in their feelings towards the religion of Islam, there does appear to be a strong 
connection between the fear of terrorism and trust in Muslim people. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the World Trade Center was attacked on September 11, 2001, notions of trust and 
security in America have been altered irreversibly. Years after this catastrophic event, American 
fear of terrorism continues to intensify, as terrorist attacks on U.S. soil and abroad become more 
and more frequent. Reports of bombings, shootings, stabbings, and even beheadings appear in 
media headlines almost daily, perpetually reaffirming a sense of fear that has plagued the minds 
of American people for over a decade. This paper will assess that fear, and its implications, 
through the analysis of data collected by the Chapman University Survey of American Fears. 
Three research questions will be explored. The first seeks to uncover why terrorism has become 
associated with Islam. The second considers the effects of this association on sociopolitical 
attitudes, including opinions on the restriction of civil liberties. The final inquiry concerns the 
forces driving the association, namely the role the media has played in the proliferation of fear 
and endorsement of stereotypes. 
This paper is organized into 6 sections. Following the introduction, is a synthesis of the 
predominant literature on the fear of Islam in the United States. Included in this literature review 
is the discussion of Islamophobia as a consequence of incidental emotions, integrated threat 
theory, and social dominance orientation. This section will provide a detailed look into the roots 
of existing perceptions of Islam and its association with terrorism. Finally, three research 
questions will be introduced to test how various factors influence attitudes towards Islam, and 
measure the extent of that influence. The third section provides an explanation of the data 
collection process. Also offered in this section is a detailed account of survey methods and 
relevant variables. In Section Four, the three research questions will be tested through the 
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comparison of means. Such analysis will demonstrate a statistically significant relationship 
between fear of terrorism and the belief that Muslims are more likely to engage in terrorist 
activity than non-Muslims. Results suggest that the more afraid an individual is, the more 
stereotypical his thinking. Data analysis will also evaluate the relationship between media 
exposure and levels of trust and fear. Finally, data will be used to demonstrate stereotypes that 
exist in society today, and the extent to which these stereotypes influence sociopolitical attitudes. 
Section Five offers additional discussion of the data, summarizing the results of the tests 
conducted in the previous section. A conclusion of the research is given in the sixth and final 
section. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Islamophobia 
One of the major challenges involved in quantifying any social phenomenon is defining 
the criteria and scope of that phenomenon. There exists no consensus as to how Islamophobia 
ought to be defined, and so long as that is the case, it remains difficult to compare and measure it 
scientifically. So long as there is no common understanding of what makes an individual 
“Islamophobic,” assessment of its relevance in this topic is also problematic. Runnymede Trust 
first defined the concept of Islamophobia as the “unfounded and close-minded fear and/or hatred 
of Islam, Muslims or Islamic/Muslim culture” (Larsson, 2015, p.14). This definition, which has 
received much attention in public discourse, is problematic for a number of reasons. The first 
issue is that Trust’s proposal is more of an Islamophobic ideology than it is a description of an 
individual’s reasons for acting. From this issue arises the question of whether an individual can 
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be said to be Islamophobic by virtue of their beliefs only, or by virtue of acting on those beliefs. 
In this sense, Trust’s definition conflicts with the principle of freedom of thought. Another issue 
which arises is whether the individual must have some sort of distinct and conscious 
Islamophobic ideology, in order to be classified as Islamophobic. If so, is it necessary that 
actions are consciously motivated by such ideology, or should situationally caused behaviors be 
considered as well?  
In much of the literature on this topic, Islamophobia is described as a deeply rooted 
ethnocentric prejudice and an unwillingness to look beyond political experience (El-Aswad, 
2013, p. 43). Others define it not as an example of prejudice but rather a paranoid fear born of 
projection (Dalal, 2008, p. 90). This section will explore the most widely discussed conceptions 
of Islamophobia, but will make no claims as to which is the true definition. This paper does not 
attempt to assert the truth of any one conception over another, but rather seeks to uncover the 
variables which most profoundly contribute to this social phenomenon. For the purposes of this 
paper, the term will refer solely to beliefs towards Islam which are based in fear. It does not 
engage in the debate over the definition of Islamophobia, but instead examines the sources of 
common associations with the religion. Further, it does not make any judgement as to whether 
these fears are warranted or unwarranted, it simply seeks to examine the causes of them.  
While there may not exist a consensus as to the principal causes of Islamophobia, there 
does appear to be a theme which is supported by all the literature on the topic. That is that there 
is an undeniable lack of trust in Muslim people among the American public.  
 
 
 
 
PROLIFERATING A CULTURE OF FEAR         5 
2.2 Fear of Terrorism 
On September 11, 2001 the Islamic extremist group al-Qaeda carried out attacks against 
the United States that would alter the American public’s perception of Islam irreversibly. 
Al-Qaeda militants hijacked four airliners and waged suicide attacks on U.S. targets in the name 
of Islam. Over 3,000 people were killed during the attacks, making them the deadliest in United 
States history. The devastation of the attacks perpetrated by Muslim extremists on behalf of 
fundamentalist Islam, has since transpired irrevocably into an association of Islam with terrorist 
activity. It is the goal of this paper to determine why that is the case, but this section will focus 
first on how fear of terrorism has contributed to such an association. 
America is no stranger to tragedy. It had suffered unconscionable acts of terrorism long 
before September of 2001. Still, nothing this country has experienced before or since, could 
compare to the devastation caused by the 9/11 attacks. The sight of two aircrafts flying into the 
towers of the World Trade Center played on television screens around the world as millions 
watched helplessly. To measure the extent of fear and distress caused by such an event seems an 
inconceivable task. The first challenge researchers face studying public fear in a post 9/11 
America, is the ambiguity of the fear itself. American citizens define the terrorist threat as an 
“abstract” threat, one that inspires not a personal fear, but rather a “collective sense of fear” 
(Kuzma, 2000, p. 92).  Terrorism is an ambiguous danger in the sense that it can be executed at 
any time, at any place, and there is very little that can be done to prevent it. The Department of 
State Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Philip Wilcox, made a similar point when describing the 
effect of terrorism on the public. He argued that it is its random quality which makes terrorism 
particularly evil. Because it strikes without warning, and preys upon innocent victims, it inflicts 
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an overwhelming psychological, political, and economic toll, thus increasing our collective sense 
of fear and vulnerability (Kuzma, 2000, p. 92).  
This sense of fear was especially pervasive in the days immediately following the 9/11 
attacks. In a study conducted three to five days after 9/11, 90% of participants reported that 
either they or their children experienced some stress symptoms as a result of the attacks (Choma, 
2015). Americans suffered anxiety to varying degrees in the wake of September 11th. In the days 
and weeks following 9/11, more than half of the American public (53 percent) was “very 
worried” that they themselves, or someone they loved would become a victim of terrorism 
(Bloch-Elkon, 2011, p. 379). Though these personal concerns waned in the years that followed, 
there is still a significant percentage of the American public that remains very worried about 
terrorism. Even eight years after the 9/11 attacks, 30 to 40 percent of Americans still feared that 
they or a member of their family could be harmed by a terrorist attack (Bloch-Elkon, 2011, p. 
379). The endurance of this fear was similarly demonstrated by responses to the 2016 Chapman 
University Survey of American Fears. Acts of terrorism which occurred on 9/11 and in the years 
following have 39% of Americans feeling either “afraid” or “very afraid” that they personally 
will become a victim of terrorism. Attitudes concerning terrorist threat have remained relatively 
constant, even as the attacks become temporally distal, the fear of terrorism persists.  
Perhaps even more relevant to this discussion than the persistence of fear, is the extent of 
it. It is important to consider how the lives of Americans who are indeed “very worried” about 
the threat of terrorism have been altered. Almost a quarter of the population is “very concerned” 
about terrorism in their daily lives, and agonize about it when they are in public places (CSAF, 
2016). This portion of the population does not see the threat of terrorism as an abstract entity, but 
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actually lives with it in their daily lives. This small but significant group has internalized the 
collective sense of fear and adjusts their lives to accommodate their fear. Such accommodations 
include, for example, a reluctance to participate in public activities, or even travel abroad. Fear 
has made 24% of Americans less likely to attend concerts, sporting events, and other public 
events (CSAF, 2016). Similarly, the belief that Americans are targets of terror when traveling 
abroad, one held by 70% of the American public, has made over half of all Americans fear 
traveling abroad (CSAF, 2016). Even those Americans who do choose to travel abroad, still 
demonstrate suspicion of this threat. In fact almost 80% of Americans are willing to accept 
additional security screening and longer lines at the airport just to mitigate the danger of 
terrorism (CSAF, 2016).  
This is likely because many Americans assume the inevitability of another large scale 
attack on the United States. The possibility of a future attack was for obvious reasons, a great 
source of anxiety immediately after 9/11, but even fifteen years later, this possibility continues to 
haunt many Americans. In the first, second, and sixth months following the September 11 
attacks, 82%, 65%, and 38% of Americans respectively suffered anxiety over the possibility of 
future terrorism (Choma, 2015). Today, some 61% of Americans still believe in this possibility 
(CSAF, 2016). Over half of the American public lives in fear that the U.S. is likely to experience 
large scale attack in the near future.  
These studies demonstrate how extensive the adverse mental health outcomes have been 
for a significant number of Americans. Collective tragedies such as 9/11 are strongly associated 
with adverse effects on mental health, physical health, and sociopolitical attitudes, including 
prejudice (Choma, 2015). The 9/11 attacks were unquestionably one of the most psychologically, 
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politically, and economically devastating tragedies this country has ever experienced. Emotions, 
particularly emotional distress, play a fundamental role in the construction of prejudicial bias 
(Choma, 2015). Because the 9/11 attacks were perpetrated by an Islamic extremist group, it is 
very possible that the emotional distress caused by these events may in part explain the 
association of terrorism with the religion of Islam. The next section will explore this possibility 
by evaluating several factors which contribute to the formation of implicit bias.  
 
2.3 Origins of “Otherness” 
In order to understand the present alienation of Muslims in our society, it is helpful to 
look as far back as the colonial era for the roots of this division. On a visit to Beirut during the 
civil war of 1975, a French journalist wrote regretfully of the gutted downtown area, that it had 
once seemed to belong to the Orient of Chateaubriand and Nerval (Said, 1978). This depiction of 
the East, according to author Edward Said, is completely indicative of its position in the rest of 
Western scholarship and history. Not only is the Middle East adjacent to Europe, it is also the 
place of Europe’s greatest, richest and oldest colonies. It is the source of its civilizations and 
languages, its cultural contestant, and one of its deepest and most recurring images of the other 
(Said, 1978). For this reason the East, or the Orient, has been characterized in Western 
Scholarship according to its special place in the European experience. European, and more 
broadly, Western culture, gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient as 
a sort of surrogate and even underground self (Said, 1978). The Middle East has helped define 
the West as its contrasting image.  
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Orientalism is an entire system of thought which, by demonstrating the comparatively 
greater strength of the Occident, has categorized Muslims as the alien and often threatening 
“other.” Although there are several million Muslims in the U.S, they remain othered, largely 
because of Orientalist thought. Orientalism regards the “Orient” or the “Muslim East” as a mirror 
image of what is the inferior and alien other to the West (El-Aswad, 2013, p.47). This binary 
discourse of East/West or Islam/West is rooted in a “they/we” division (El-Aswad, 2013, p.47). 
In the Western imagination, the Muslim is located outside of the U.S, and therefore is made a 
container of all that is opposite of the virtues that are attributed to the U.S. (Dalal, 2008, p. 90). 
In the unconscious denigrations of Islam, the Muslim has become the opposite of the American 
“us” (Dalal, 2008, p. 90).  
What then takes place in the words of Sigmund Freud, is a “reaction formation.” Such a 
mechanism obscures a concept by emphasizing its opposite (Dalal, 2008, p. 90). Their 
mysterious otherness is a blank space waiting to be filled with projections imagined by the 
Western scholar. As Freud once put it, the unconscious knows no contradiction. The result is an 
image of the “other” modelled on a ‘minority of the worst of them,’ and an image of the “us” 
modelled on a ‘minority of the best of us’ (Dalal, 2008, p. 90). Thus parts come to stand for 
wholes, and it is through this “emotional generalization from the few to the whole” that the 
Jihadist comes to stand for all followers of Islam (Dalal, 2008, p. 90). In this sense Islam has 
become a postulate of fear, and Muslims have become the enemy, imagined or real. 
Islamophobic attitudes are most commonly regarded as a consequence of uninformed 
notions of Islam. In much of the contemporary discourse, grave ignorance about Muslims and 
their stereotypical depiction in Western scholarship is deemed responsible for negative attitudes 
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towards Islam. Persistent views of Islam and Muslim communities are believed to have resulted 
from a reliance on second-hand information and a lack of direct contact with the religion itself 
(El-Aswad, 2013, p.44). The consequences of ignorance are even further exacerbated by a 
greater unwillingness to learn about the religion. It is because we are unable or unwilling to 
discriminate between varieties of Islamic belief—the fundamentalist vs. the rest—that we end up 
homogenizing them, and so damning them all (Dalal, 2008, p. 90).  
 
2.4 Forming Implicit Bias 
In order to identify the sources which contribute to Islamophobic attitudes, it can be 
helpful to understand how attitudes are developed in general. Distinctions between explicit 
attitudes and implicit attitudes can help us recognize what might be informing them. Explicit 
attitudes are evaluations that can be reported and for which expression can be consciously 
controlled (McConnell, 2008, p. 793). By contrast, implicit attitudes are evaluations for which 
activation cannot be controlled (McConnell, 2008, p. 793). In fact, often times, people are not 
initially conscious of their implicit attitudes. It is important to note the difference between the 
two, because they have different levels of influence over a person’s behaviors. For example, 
knowledge of a social group can influence implicit attitudes even when a person devotes 
significant attention to understanding that social group (McConnell, 2008, p. 793). If knowledge 
of a social group leads to negative evaluations, the group can become stigmatized. Stigmatized 
groups are often avoided or devalued, and therefore provide a negative association cue. 
Association based cues, such as race, play a critical role in determining implicit attitudes 
(McConnell, 2008, p. 794). Implicit attitudes are then more likely than explicit attitudes, to guide 
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spontaneous behaviors in low effort situations (McConnell, 2008, p. 794). To the extent that 
stigmas impact implicit attitudes more strongly than they do explicit attitudes, it may often be the 
case that people will remain unaware of their stigma-related biases (McConnell, 2008, p. 794). 
This lack of awareness presents a roadblock in reducing prejudice and discrimination. 
People are far less attentive to information which individuates a person from a stigmatized group 
(McConnell, 2008, p. 805). Therefore, stigmas may frequently discourage people from 
acknowledging information that could present a stigmatized person in a much more positive 
light. Even in the event that positive behaviors are encountered, the extent to which they will be 
effortfully recognized may be limited (McConnell, 2008, p. 805). The formation of implicit 
attitudes towards social groups may demonstrate the prioritization of negative association cues 
over actual individuating information available to the perceiver (McConnell, 2008, p. 805). 
Unconscious associations make it less likely that bias will be corrected.  
 
2.5 Integrated Threat Theory 
Threat can also serve as a predictor of prejudice.  Since 9/11, negative views of Islam and 
of Muslims have been justified by an imminent yet unpredictable threat posed by terrorist attacks 
to the physical safety of Americans. Today, over half of the American public fears that the U.S. 
is likely to experience a large scale attack in the near future (CSAF, 2016). The Integrated Threat 
Theory is a social theory which suggests that the more individuals perceive certain social groups 
as threatening, the more likely they are to have prejudice against these groups. It identifies four 
types of threat that are associated with prejudice. Included in this list are realistic threats, 
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symbolic threats, negative stereotypes, and intergroup anxiety. Each of these constructs have 
been empirically tested and have been found to predict prejudice (Uenal, 2016 pg. 69).  
The first type of threat, realistic threats, relate to political and economic power as well as 
to the physical well-being and safety of the in group (Uenal, 2016 pg. 69). This can include 
concerns regarding material goods or physical well-being. Threats concerning physical safety are 
empirically distinct from threats concerning jobs, accommodations, and other material things 
(Uenal, 2016 pg. 70). Even in the absence of other threats, feelings of insecurity over physical 
safety can incite prejudice towards an outgroup. Safety threats demonstrate a strong predictive 
power regarding specific intergroup outcomes (Uenal, 2016 pg. 69). Such outcomes include 
social and political intolerance towards Muslims.  
Symbolic threats are also an instigator of prejudice. Symbolic threats are threats to the 
values, norms, morals, or identity of the in-group (Uenal, 2016 pg. 69). Islam is frequently 
pictured in the media an archaic, barbarian, and sexist religion (Uenal, 2016 pg. 69). This 
characterization of Muslims presents a threat to the values and norms of the liberal-democratic 
American society. As with realistic threats, previous studies have confirmed a positive 
relationship between symbolic threats and prejudice (Uenal, 2016 pg. 69).  
Studies demonstrate a strong connection between perceived terroristic threats and 
anti-Muslim intergroup bias. Threats concerning terrorism are significantly related to subtle and 
blatant prejudice, and discriminatory behavior against Muslims (Uenal, 2016 pg. 69). Different 
types of threat can elicit different emotional reactions. While safety threats are a distinct 
predictor of fear, symbolic and realistic threats are more strongly associated with anger and 
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disgust (Uenal, 2016 pg. 70) 
 
2.6  Social Dominance Orientation 
Also relevant in understanding how prejudice towards Muslims is formed, is a theory 
which deals with social dominance. Social Dominance Theory suggests that high status groups 
tend to support social-hierarchical structures which favor the dominance of the in-group, and 
demand the subordination of the outgroup (Uenal, 2016 pg. 72). This partially explains why a 
significant portion of the American population endorses the restriction of civil liberties and 
policies which target Muslims specifically. Almost 40% of Americans support an increased 
police presence in Muslim neighborhoods (CSAF, 2016). Over 33% believe America should 
cease all Muslim immigration (CSAF, 2016). 
Social Dominance Orientation is a relatively new concept which can be helpful in 
explaining why individuals support non-egalitarian policies and attitudes. SDO assesses the 
extent to which individuals endorse social hierarchies between different groups, and the rejection 
of social equality (Uenal, 2016 pg. 72). As indicated by the Social Dominance Theory, 
individuals who exhibit high SDO tend to perpetuate or improve their social standing by 
adopting “dominance legitimizing myths” (Uenal, 2016 pg. 72). Through the acceptance of these 
myths, social hierarchies are explained and justified.  
Additionally individuals with high SDO seem to be more vulnerable to high threat 
perceptions, and may therefore perceive the rising visibility of Islam in American society as 
threatening to the status of the non-Muslim in-group (Uenal, 2016 pg. 72). As a result of such 
threat perceptions, individuals showing a higher SDO could exhibit more prejudice toward the 
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perceived Muslim outgroup. It is likely that this vulnerability to high threat perceptions is what 
incites anxiety about the presence of Muslims in our society. Nearly half of the American public 
is not comfortable with the possibility of a Mosque being built in their neighborhood (CSAF, 
2016). The Chapman University Survey of American Fears demonstrated similar worries about 
Muslims handing out copies of the Quran, or simply congregating outside a shopping center. 
 
2.7 Media Influence and Incidental Emotions 
The extent of media influence on formation of bias is widely debated in the context of 
Islamophobia. Its portrayal or even fabrication of reality plays a crucial role in the formation of 
public opinion. Since 9/11 the volume of terrorism related news has surpassed all past records of 
terrorism coverage (Bloch-Elkon, 2011, p. 367). Not only did reports outpace coverage from the 
80’s and 90’s, it also prioritized the proliferation of fear. In the months following 9/11, bin 
Laden received more attention in television news than President Bush (Bloch-Elkon, 2011, p. 
379). With the prioritization of terrorism on the news agenda then and now, it is inevitable that 
the public will similarly prioritize the threat of terrorism.  
Mainstream media portrays Muslims in terms of global terrorism and Islamic Jihadism, 
by repeatedly stressing the reality of suicide bombings, flag burning, and the misconduct of 
Muslims (El-Aswad, 2013, p. 41). The result is a state of moral panic. This phenomenon, as 
defined by Sociologist Stanley Cohen, refers to the distinction of a group as a threat to societal 
values and interests, after that group has been presented by the mass media in a stereotypical 
fashion (Laycock, 2015, p. 41). The concept of moral panic is consistent with literature in the 
discipline of Psychology which defines the role of incidental emotions in the formation of 
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stereotypes. Incidental emotions principally relevant to an outgroup increase intergroup bias 
toward that outgroup in particular (Choma, 2015). One study examined these incidental 
emotions, specifically symptoms of distress, by testing the effects viewing 9/11 footage ten years 
after the attacks. Because distress was among the most commonly reported mental health 
outcomes after 9/11, and negative attitudes towards Muslims intensified following the attacks, 
this study sought to uncover whether distress might in part explain the relationship between 9/11 
and Islamophobia. Studies revealed that viewing 9/11 footage fostered greater fear of future 
terrorism and Islamophobia (Choma, 2015). Less positive attitudes towards Muslims were 
reported by those in the 9/11 condition compared to the neutral condition, indicating the negative 
effects of viewing 9/11 footage on intergroup attitudes, even ten years later (Choma, 2015). 
Results are consistent with literature suggesting that emotions can impact prejudicial and 
sociopolitical attitudes. Western media is therefore, one of many sources which informs 
sociopolitical attitudes towards Islam.  
 
3. Data Collection and Coding 
The data set used to test the hypothesis was Wave 3 of the Chapman University Survey of 
American Fears. This national survey studies the degree to which respondents fear crime, 
terrorist attacks, natural disasters, personal crises and other phenomena. The study was 
conducted using a probability based web survey designed to be representative of the United 
States. The target population consisted of English language survey takers ages 18 and over. 
Statistical analysis was primarily conducted through the comparison of means. By 
comparing means, we can examine the relationship between two variables. In this procedure one 
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variable is interval or ratio level and the other is nominal level. The first of the variables tested 
asked respondents “How afraid are you of the following events? [Terrorist Attack]”. 
Respondents could indicate either (1) Very afraid, (2) Afraid, (3) Slightly afraid, or (4) Not 
afraid, depending on the degree of their fear. The second variable asked participants “How much 
do you trust the following people? [Muslims]”. Participants could indicate their degree of trust or 
distrust using the following responses: (1) Trust completely, (2) Trust somewhat, (3) Do not trust 
very much, and (4) Do not trust at all. The final variable which was tested in relation to those 
previously mentioned, asked respondents to indicate their level of agreement with the following: 
“Muslims are more likely to engage in terrorism than non-Muslims.” Participants could indicate 
their degree of assent with the response (1) Strongly agree, (2) Agree, (3) Disagree, or (4) 
Strongly disagree. Responses to this question are representative of Islamophobic attitudes within 
American society today. 
The second section of data analysis demonstrates frequencies using a bar graph. Five 
relevant variables are represented. Each asks a question which demonstrates a general feeling of 
distrust towards Muslims. For each of these five questions, responses are ordered from (1) 
Strongly agree, (2) Agree, (3) Disagree, to (4) Strongly disagree. The first asks respondents to 
indicate their level of agreement with the following statement: “I think it is ok for Muslims to 
receive extra screening at the airport”. The second variable represented in the bar graph, which 
was also tested in the previous section, asks respondents whether they believe “Muslims are 
more likely to engage in terrorism than non-Muslims”. The third variable asks participants 
whether they agree that “There should be an increased police presence in Muslim 
neighborhoods”. The fourth variable asks respondents whether they endorse the claim that 
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“America should cease all immigration from Muslim countries”. The final variable depicted on 
the bar graph asks respondents if they agree with the statement  “I would be comfortable with 
having a Mosque built in my neighborhood”.  
The final section of data analysis, like the first, uses the comparison of means to test two 
relationships. The first is the relationship between media usage and fear of Muslims. The second 
is the relationship between media usage and level of trust in Muslims. The same two variables 
which were tested in the first section: “How afraid are you of the following events? [Terrorist 
Attack]” and “How much do you trust the following people? [Muslims]” are also tested here. In 
this section, responses are now being compared against varying levels of media exposure. Levels 
of fear and distrust are weighed according to how often the respondent watches either national 
nightly network news, or cable news. Participants were asked “How often do you watch the 
national nightly network news (such as World News Tonight, CBS Evening News)?” and “How 
often do you watch cable news (CNN, MSNBC, Fox News)?”. Several other media sources were 
represented in the data set, but only two are represented in the data analysis section. 
 
4.     Data Analysis 
The following section will provide a number of statistical measurements which 
demonstrate how the various factors discussed contribute to stereotypical beliefs about Islam. 
Analysis will include the comparison of means across variables to determine which beliefs 
coincide with one another. Once the existence of each particular relationship has been either 
confirmed or denied, additional analysis will then explore the extent of these relationships.  
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4.1   Q1 
Research Question I: ​Why has terrorism become associated with Islam? 
 
The table above provides a comparison of means across two variables. The first variable 
asks “How afraid are you of terrorist attacks?” Responses are ordered by degree of fear, with 1 
indicating the greatest level fear, and 4 indicating the least fear. The second variable measures 
the respondent’s level of agreement with the statement “Muslims are more likely to engage in 
terrorism than non-Muslims.” Responses are ranked from 1 to 4, with 1 representing strongly 
agree, and 4 representing strongly disagree. 
In the comparison provided, the smaller the mean, the closer it is to the number 1, which 
indicates the response “strongly agree.” Therefore, the smallest mean indicates the strongest 
agreement with the statement “Muslims are more likely to engage in terrorism than 
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non-Muslims.” Correspondingly, the largest mean indicates the strongest disagreement with the 
previous statement. 
The comparison of means reveals that those who most strongly agree with this statement, 
are also those who are most afraid, or “very afraid” of terrorist attacks. Those who most strongly 
disagree with this statement, are also those who are least afraid, or “not afraid” of terrorist 
attacks. Therefore fear of terrorism does seem to be related to the endorsement of stereotypical 
beliefs.  
 
The second table offers a slightly different comparison. Agreement with the statement 
“Muslims are more likely to engage in terrorist activity than non-Muslims” is this time being 
compared with responses to the question “How much do you trust Muslims?”. Responses to this 
question are ranked from 1 to 4 with 1 being the greatest level of trust, or “trust completely,” and 
4 being the lowest level of trust, or “do not trust at all”.  
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Again, the smaller the mean, the closer it is to the number 1, which indicates the response 
“strongly agree.” Therefore, the smallest mean indicates the strongest agreement with the 
statement “Muslims are more likely to engage in terrorism than non-Muslims.” The largest mean 
indicates the strongest disagreement with the previous statement. 
By comparing the means in this table we find that those who most strongly agree with the 
statement “Muslims are more likely to engage in terrorist activity than non-Muslims” are also 
those who trust Muslims least or “do not trust at all”. Those who most strongly disagree with this 
statement, are also those who are most trusting of Muslims, or “trust completely”. The data 
suggests that distrust for the Muslim outgroup may foster stereotypical beliefs about them.  
 
4.2   Q2 
Research Question II: ​What is the effect of this association on sociopolitical attitudes? 
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The bar graph includes five questions that directly measure opinions regarding Muslims.  
 Variables include whether Muslims should be subjected to increased screening at airports, if 
police presence should be increased in Muslim neighborhoods, whether America should cease all 
immigration from Muslim countries, if Muslims are more likely to be terrorists, and if 
respondents would be comfortable with a mosque being built in their neighborhood.  
1. 58.7% of the American public endorsed extra security screening at the airport.  
2. 33.1% of Americans believe that Muslims are more likely to be terrorists than 
non-Muslims.  
3. 36.3% of Americans support an increased police presence in Muslim neighborhoods. 
4. 33.1% of Americans feel that the government should cease all Muslim immigration. 
5. 51.2% of all Americans would feel comfortable with a mosque being built in their 
neighborhood.  
 
4.3   Q3 
Research Question III: ​What is fueling this association? 
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In this section media exposure is being analyzed in relation to levels of trust in Muslims 
and levels of fear. In the table above, responses to the question “How much do you trust 
Muslims?” are compared with responses to the question “How often do you watch national 
nightly network news?”. Responses the first question are ranked from 1 to 4, with 1 representing 
trust completely, and 4 representing do not trust at all. The larger the mean, the closer it is to the 
number 4, which indicates the response do not trust at all. Therefore, the highest mean indicates 
the lowest degree of trust in Muslims. Correspondingly, the smallest mean indicates the greatest 
trust level of trust in Muslim people. 
 
 
In this table, the question “How much do you trust Muslims?” is being tested in relation 
to exposure to cable news. The second variable measures how often the respondent watches 
cable news stations such as CNN, MSNBC, or Fox. The highest mean in this comparison appears 
by those who watch cable news everyday. The lowest mean appears by those who watch cable 
news less than once a month but at least once a year.  
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This table and the next evaluate a slightly different relationship. The new variable being 
compared here asks “How afraid are you of terrorist attacks?”. Responses to this question are 
ranked from 1 to 4 with 1 indicating the greatest level of fear, and 4 indicating the lowest level of 
fear. Therefore the smaller the mean, the closer it is to 1, or the response “very afraid”. The 
larger the mean, the closer it is to 4, or “not afraid”. The smallest mean is found next to those 
who watch national nightly network news everyday. The largest mean appears by those who 
never watch it at all.  
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The final table assesses viewership of cable news in relation to fear of terrorist attacks. In 
this comparison there is a clear decline of fear as you move from frequent media exposure 
towards zero exposure. The smallest mean appears by those who watch cable news everyday and 
the largest appears by those who never watch it. Those who watch the news more frequently are 
more afraid of terrorism. 
 
5. Results 
Q 1:  
The comparison of means reveals that those who most strongly agree with the statement 
“Muslims are more likely to engage in terrorism than non-Muslims,” are also those who are most 
afraid, or “very afraid” of terrorist attacks. Those who most strongly disagree with this statement, 
are those who are least afraid, or “not afraid” of terrorist attacks. The more afraid an individual 
is, the more stereotypical his thinking. Similarly, the less afraid an individual is, the less likely he 
is to engage in stereotypical thinking. 
Additionally, those who trust Muslims least, are the greatest supporters of the statement 
“Muslims are more likely to engage in terrorism than non-Muslims”. Those who have the most 
trust in Muslims are less supportive of that statement. Feelings of trust or distrust for a particular 
outgroup seem to be related to the formation of stereotypes about that outgroup. 
 
Q 2: 
Results show that a significant portion of the American population distrusts Muslims and 
believes extra security measures should be employed against them. This climate of suspicion has 
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led many Americans to endorse greater scrutiny of Muslims by law enforcement, including extra 
security screening at airports. Nearly one-third of Americans believe that Muslims are more 
likely to engage in terrorism than non-Muslims. Roughly the same percentage agree or strongly 
agree that the U.S. should halt all immigration from Muslim nations, and an even greater number 
believe that Muslim neighborhoods should have an increased police presence. The majority of 
the American population would not be comfortable with a Mosque being built in their 
neighborhood. Those who support institutionalized discrimination are more likely to be rural, 
male, white, older, and lacking a college education.  
 
Q 3:  
Data analysis demonstrates a statistically significant relationship between media usage 
and fear, as well as media usage and distrust. Those who have greater exposure to media, 
whether it be, local news, cable news, or national news, are more likely to distrust Muslims. 
Another consequence of high media usage is greater fear of terrorist attacks. Survey results 
illustrate the ability of media to influence public opinion, especially towards a certain outgroup.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Fear of terrorism contributes significantly to the association of terrorism with Islam. This 
collective sense of fear is shared by almost half of the American public today. Nearly 41% of 
Americans are either “afraid” or “very afraid” of terrorist attacks. As demonstrated by the 
literature and data, fear is indeed a motivator of stereotypical thinking. Incidental emotional like 
distress and fear are relevant for understanding stereotypes towards Muslims, especially in the 
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context of the 9/11 attacks. Monolithic views of Islam and Muslims are also the result of a 
reliance on second hand information, and lack of direct contact with the religion. To reduce these 
negative consequences we must minimize social category distinctions and establish meaningful 
connections with outgroup members.  
Media coverage which characterizes Muslims as the threatening “other,” perpetuates 
negative outgroup attitudes and culture-based narratives of intergroup conflict. Media ought to, 
instead, refrain from social categorization, offer more balanced information, and reduce 
heightened threat perceptions to avoid further aggravating intergroup tensions. In order to reduce 
intergroup tension, public discourse should promote alternative narratives which account for the 
complexities of intergroup relations.  
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